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INTRODUCTION 
Nathan Fields, an African-American employee at the New York 
State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities 
("OMRDD"), was in many ways the typical Title VIP employment 
discrimination plaintiff, with a case that, on its face, suggested both 
discriminatory and benign actions by his employer.2 For six years,3 
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994), prohibits discrimi­
nation on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin by private and public em­
ployers, labor organizations, and employment agencies. 1 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION§ 1 .01 (2d ed. 2001). The statute reaches decisions related to hiring, firing, 
promoting, classifying, and compensating employees, as well as employment conditions. Id. 
2. Fields v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 115 
F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 1997). 
234 
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Fields worked as a maintenance assistant in the electrical shop at 
OMRDD's Oswald D. Heck Developmental Center ("Heck"). During 
that time, he twice applied for a promotion, and on each occasion, 
Heck selected white employees for the position.4 In addition, Fields 
claimed that he was discriminatorily singled out for disciplinary treat­
ment, that he was assigned to a disfavored work shift, and that he re­
ceived fewer opportunities for overtime work than his white co­
workers. 5 Fields offered statistical evidence indicating that Heck dis­
proportionately assigned the tedious and difficult "ballast" work to the 
minority employees of the electrical shop.6 Fields's statistics also re­
vealed that Heck did not randomly assign job pairings in the electrical 
shop; rather, Heck tended to assign minorities to work with other mi­
norities, while disparately matching white workers with other whites. 7 
Finally, Fields testified that on two or three occasions he heard white 
employees make racial jokes or slurs about minority co-workers.8 
As is the case in many employment discrimination "disparate 
treatment" claims,9 however, other facts - including Fields's spotty 
employment record and Heck's ability to articulate legitimate, nondis­
criminatory reasons for many of its actions - complicated the plain­
tiff's claims. Fields himself acknowledged, for example, that he was 
poorly qualified for the promotions, and that he had accumulated 
3. Heck hired Fields as a Grade 8 maintenance assistant in 1985 and promoted him to 
Grade 9 in 1986. Id. at 1 17. In 1989, Fields joined the Navy and went on military leave with­
out pay from Heck. Id. Fields rejoined Heck's workforce in 1992, and he filed suit against his 
employer in  May 1994. Id. at 1 17, 1 19. Fields's lawsuit related only to actions taken by his 
employer after Fields's 1992 reinstatement. Id. at 1 17. 
4. Id. at 1 18. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 119. 
8. Id. 
9. This Note deals solely with the type of employment discrimination cases commonly 
termed "disparate treatment" claims, which are distinguished from "disparate impact" cases. 
See lnt'I Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) (employing 
terminology of "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact"); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. 
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 581-82 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring) (same). In a disparate treat­
ment claim, an individual plaintiff alleges that she was specifically injured by the defendant 
employer's discriminatory conduct. See generally 1 LARSON, supra note 1, at § 1.09[1]. Dis­
parate impact claims, by contrast, deal with employers' practices that, while neutral on their 
face, disproportionately bar members of the plaintiff's class from a particular position or 
from employment altogether. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See gener­
ally 1 LARSON, supra, at § 1 .09[1]. If an employment practice or hiring device (such as a 
seniority system or literacy test) is neither job related nor a business necessity, it may be 
found discriminatory under a disparate impact analysis. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431, 436; 1 
LARSON, supra, at § 1.09. Disparate impact claims often are brought as class actions, and 
plaintiffs routinely use statistical evidence to show that the challenged employment practice 
has a disparate effect on members of the protected class. See generally 1 LARSON, supra, at 
§§ 1.09[1], 8.01[2]. 
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negative time, attendance, and performance records while at Heck. '0 
In addition, Heck demonstrated that it assigned the tasks protested by 
Fields largely on the basis of the different levels of experience and ex­
pertise of each of its workers - not on the basis of the employees' 
races.11 The jury agreed with the defendant's explanation, returning a 
verdict in favor of Heck on all of Fields's claims, and the Second Cir­
cuit affirmed the jury's verdict on appeal.12 
An examination of Fields illustrates the many problems with the 
current state of Title VII claims and the extent to which the Supreme 
Court's artificial distinctions between different standards in this con­
text have broken down. The trial judge in the case offered jury instruc­
tions that were, according to the appellate court, "needlessly confus­
ing. "13 The judge informed the jury that the plaintiff could prevail 
either (1) by proving that the defendant was animated by a "discrimi­
natory motive," or (2) by proving both that Heck's stated reasons for 
its actions were pretextual and that its real reasons were discrimina­
tory.14 These separate prongs derive from two distinct strains of dispa­
rate treatment law - what are termed "mixed-motive" and "pretext" 
claims. Although the trial court's instructions were not completely ac­
curate, the Second Circuit complicated the analysis even further by 
blurring the lower court's two prongs. In order to understand how the 
appellate court collapsed the two prongs, it is important first to ex­
amine the source of the trial court's distinction. 
The second half of the trial court's instruction in Fields derives 
from the burden-shifting framework laid out by the Supreme Court in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.15 In an ordinary McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine case,16 the plaintiff first must make out a prima facie 
case by showing that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she 
was qualified for a job or promotion for which she applied; (3) she was 
rejected; and (4) the position remained open or was filled by another 
applicant.1 7 Once the plaintiff has established this prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the employer, who must articulate a legitimate, non-
10. Fields, 1 13 F.3d at 1 18. 
11 .  Id. at 118-19. 
12. Id. at 117, 119. 
13. Id. at 121. 
14. Id. 
15. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
16. The Supreme Court reiterated the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case in Texas 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), leading some courts and 
scholars to refer to the burden-shifting scheme as the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine frame­
work. E.g. , Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2232 (1995). This Note follows commentators like Malamud in refer­
ring to the common framework for pretext claims as McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. 
17. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53; see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
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discriminatory reason for the employment action.18 If the defendant 
satisfies this burden, the plaintiff then must demonstrate that the de­
fendant's proffered reason is pretextual, and that the actual motive for 
its actions was discriminatory.19 The Court recently indicated that, 
where the plaintiff has demonstrated pretext, the prima facie case it­
self may be sufficient evidence' froin which the jury can infer that the 
defendant's actual motivation was discriminatory.20 
After the Court handed down its decision in 1973, McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine's burden-shifting framework dominated the land­
scape of employment discrimination claims. In the 1980s, however, a 
different form of analysis emerged, as lower courts held that discrimi­
nation plaintiffs could establish a violation of Title VII by proving that 
an unlawful motive had played some role in an employment decision.21 
This analysis allowed plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case by 
pointing to naked instances of discrimination without satisfying each 
of the four prongs required to show pretext under McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine. When the circuits began to disagree over this new 
proof structure, the Supreme Court sought to resolve the issue in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins22 - one of several notable Title VII cases 
during the 1989 term.23 
Price Waterhouse is central to this Note for two important reasons. 
The decision not only recognized mixed-motive claims as a strand of 
disparate treatment analysis separate from McDonnell Douglas­
Burdine, but a concurring opinion also introduced the "direct evi­
dence" requirement that has created considerable confusion ever 
since. In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court faced a case in which 
the employer had "mixed motives" for its challenged action - where, 
in other words, both legitimate and discriminatory rationales moti-
18. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53. 
19. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). 
20. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). The Court 
continued, however, to cite Hicks's focus on the ultimate question of discrimination, sug­
gesting that plaintiffs should make an additional showing of discriminatory motives - or at 
least rebut the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation - rather than simply 
rest on their prima facie case. See id. 
21. See, e.g. , Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985). 
22. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) 
23. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that majority employees who were 
not parties to a consent decree between an employer and minority employees are not barred 
by res judicata effects from challenging employment decisions made under the consent de­
cree); Lorance v. AT&T Techs. Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (holding that the triggering event 
for a Title VII claim occurs when the employer engages in the allegedly discriminatory act, 
not when an employee first feels its effect); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 
(1989) (holding that the burden of persuasion in a disparate impact claim rests always with 
the plaintiff); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that 
§ 1981 protects against discrimination only in the making and enforcement, not the perform­
ance, of contracts). 
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vated its decision.24 In Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, the Court 
held that the plaintiff bore the initial burden of showing that a dis­
criminatory reason was a substantial or motivating factor in the em­
ployment decision.25 If the plaintiff made this showing, the burden 
then shifted to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evi­
dence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not re­
lied on the unlawful factor (the so-called "same-decision" defense ).2 6  
Thus, simply stated, Price Waterhouse centrally held that the defen­
dant in a mixed-motive case can avoid liability by prevailing on the 
same-decision defense. 
In retrospect, a concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse is perhaps 
more notable than the plurality's holding. In her concurrence, Justice 
O'Connor stated that plaintiffs in mixed-motive cases must present 
"direct evidence" that the employer placed "substantial negative reli­
ance on an illegitimate criterion" in reaching its decision.2 7 The lower 
courts quickly latched on to Justice O'Connor's wording, and, despite 
the fact that she offered little explanation of her terminology, the di­
rect evidence standard became the touchstone of mixed-motive 
cases.28 
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("CRA"),29 Congress responded to 
a handful of decisions from the Supreme Court's 1989 term, including 
Price Waterhouse, that many advocates viewed as hostile to civil rights 
- and specifically to victims of employment discrimination.30 Most 
important for the purposes of this Note, the CRA states that any em­
ployment decision in which a protected characteristic is a "motivating 
24. 490 U.S. at 236-37. For a fuller discussion of Price Waterhouse, see infra Section I.A. 
25. Id. at 241. 
26. Id. at 242. 
27. Id. at 276-77 ("In my view, in order to justify shifting the burden on the issue of cau­
sation to the defendant, a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an 
illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision."). Justice O'Connor offered 
only the following explanation in defining her direct evidence requirement: 
(S]tray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual harassment, cannot jus­
tify requiring the employer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on le­
gitimate criteria. Nor can statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmak­
ers unrelated to the decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiffs burden in this 
regard. 
Id. at 277 (internal citation omitted). 
28. See Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572, 581-82 (1st Cir. 1999) (compil­
ing cases). 
29. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered subsections of 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)). Among other amendments, the CRA added §§ 703(m) and 
706(g)(2)(B) to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 
241, 253-66 (codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17 (1994)). 
30. See supra note 23 (listing cases and summarizing holdings); see also infra notes 89-92 
and accompanying text (discussing cases). 
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factor" constitutes a violation of Title VIl.31 In contrast to Price 
Waterhouse, the CRA does not exempt from liability employers who 
succeed on the same-decision defense; it merely limits the damages 
that can be levied against them.32 The legislators failed to specify, 
however, whether they intended the CRA to embrace or abandon 
Justice O'Connor's direct evidence standard for mixed-motive cases.33 
The lower courts responded to the ambiguities of Justice 
O'Connor's Price Waterhouse concurrence and the CRA by fixating 
on the direct evidence standard. Although only Justice O'Connor and 
the three dissenters agreed that plaintiffs must adduce direct evidence 
in order to establish a mixed-motive claim, most circuits have followed 
the minority in requiring direct evidence as· a threshold for mixed­
motive claims.34 Since embracing this standard with near uniformity, 
however, the courts have struggled to reach a common understanding 
of direct evidence in assessing mixed-motive claims. 
The circuit courts currently fall into three general schools of 
thought with respect to the meaning of "direct evidence."35 The differ­
ence among the separate camps is measured by the degree of circum-
Id. 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994). This portion of the statute provides: 
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is estab­
lished when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice. 
32. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (1994), a defendant found liable under § 2000e-
2(m) can limit its damages by showing that it would have made the same decision absent the 
impermissible consideration. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text (providing the 
text of the provisions and explaining the parties' burdens under the CRA). 
33. See infra Section l.C.1 (discussing legislative history). 
34. The Second Circuit noted the incongruity of adopting a requirement that a majority 
of the Price Waterhouse Court did not endorse. Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 
1 176, 1 183 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Despite the inarguable fact that only four justices in Price Water­
house would have imposed a 'direct evidence' requirement for 'mixed-motives' cases, most 
circuits have engrafted this requirement into caselaw."). Nonetheless, "when no single ra­
tionale commands a majority, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken 
by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.' " City of 
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 765 n.9 (1988) (internal citation omit­
ted). In Price Waterhouse, Justice O'Connor concurred on narrower grounds than Justice 
White, and her opinion therefore controls. 
35. Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572, 581-83 (1st Cir. 1999) (defining the 
three camps and identifying the circuits that adopt each position). Michael A. Zubrensky 
was the first commentator to note that the circuits generally fall into three camps on this is­
sue. See Michael A. Zubrensky, Note, Despite the Smoke, There Is No Gun: Direct Evidence 
Requirements in Mixed-Motives Employment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 959 (1994). Since Zubrensky examined the problem in 1994, the three-way 
split has remained substantially the same, but the landscape has shifted, with circuit courts 
jumping routinely from one position to another. Although this Note offers a brief summary 
of the split as it currently stands, the lesson to be drawn from the circuit split is not the dif­
ferent approaches that the courts have adopted, but simply the degree to which the mixed­
motive doctrine has created confusion among the lower courts. 
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stantial evidence that the courts allow to satisfy the direct evidence re­
quirement. The first school, sometimes termed the "classic" position, 
is the strictest in its definition of direct evidence.3 6 These courts re­
quire mixed-motive plaintiffs to present evidence that suffices to 
prove, without inference, presumption, or consideration of other evi­
dence, that a discriminatory animus motivated the defendant em­
ployer in the challenged employment decision.37 The second camp, 
called the "animus plus" position, is somewhat more generous to 
plaintiffs. These courts hold that direct evidence includes statements 
or conduct by the employer that directly reflect the alleged discrimina­
tory animus, and that relate precisely to the employment decision at 
issue.38 Under this approach, the required evidence may be either di­
rect or circumstantial.39 Finally, the third school, or "animus" position, 
requires only direct or circumstantial evidence that shows a discrimi­
natory animus.40 Unlike the animus-plus school, this approach does 
not require that the evidence bear squarely on the particular employ­
ment decision at issue.41 
The distinction between pretext claims - those that ask the jury to 
infer discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine frame­
work - and mixed-motive claims - those that invoke Price 
Waterhouse by presenting direct evidence of discrimination - only 
exacerbates the confusion regarding the direct evidence requirement. 
Because plaintiffs are unsure whether the evidence they have pro­
duced is "direct" enough to satisfy the particular court, they often seek 
36. Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 582. 
37. Id. The Fifth Circuit adopts this view, see, e.g. , Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 
F.3d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1995); Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th 
Cir. 1993), as do the Tenth, see, e.g. , Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th 
Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Wiltel, Inc., 81 F.3d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1996), and Eleventh Circuits, 
see, e.g. , Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir. 1998); 
Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1 181, 1189 (11th Cir. 1997). But see Wright v. South­
land Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 1999) (permitting inference). 
38. Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 582. 
39. Id. The Third, see, e.g. , Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998), Fourth, see, e.g. , Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 
F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir. 1999) (en bane), Seventh, see, e.g., Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 
1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1999), Eighth, see, e.g., Deneed v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 431, 
436 (8th Cir. 1998); Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1997), 
and District of Columbia Circuits, see, e.g. , Thomas v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 
131 F.3d 198, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1997), all at one point have endorsed the animus-plus position. 
40. Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 582. 
41. Id. The Second Circuit falls in this category, see, e.g. , Lightfoot v. Union Carbide 
Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 913 (2d Cir. 1997); Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 
182 (2d Cir. 1992), and the Seventh, see, e.g. , Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 
69 F.3d 1344, 1348-50 (7th Cir. 1995), and Eleventh Circuits, see, e.g. , Wright, 187 F.3d at 
1303-04, have also shown intermittent approval of this approach. 
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to instruct the jury on both pretext and mixed-motive claims.42 In this 
way, if the evidence is held to be indirect, the plaintiff can still fall 
back on the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analysis. These dual instruc­
tions, however, are complex, and they serve only to confuse the jury. 
Thus, because of the pretext/mixed-motive distinction - and because 
of the direct evidence muddle - the law of disparate treatment claims 
has become, as one commentator aptly stated, a "swamp" that makes 
little sense to plaintiffs, employers, academics, or the courts.43 
The Second Circuit's opinion in Fields illustrates the depth of this 
quagmire. After losing on his race discrimination claim against Heck 
at the trial court level, Fields appealed the court's jury instructions, ar­
guing that the CRA had abolished the distinction between pretext and 
mixed-motive instructions.44 The Second Circuit, however, rejected 
this contention, holding that the legislative history did not support 
Fields's interpretation.45 In a footnote, the court stated that mixed­
motive instructions, which it termed "dual motivation" charges, differ 
from pretext instructions, or "substantial motivation" charges, only in 
one respect: the defendant's affirmative defense that it would have 
made the same decision absent the impermissible consideration.46 In 
other words, under both McDonnell Douglas-Burdine and the CRA, 
the jury determines whether a discriminatory rationale was a moti­
vating factor in the employer's adverse employment action.47 A mixed­
motive plaintiff then faces the additional hurdle of the defendant's 
same-decision defense. Requesting a mixed-motive instruction is sim-
42. See Rose v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. 00-7599, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15794, at 
*17 (2d Cir. July 16, 2001) ("[A] plaintiff may request a Price Waterhouse charge based on 
evidence of a forbidden motive even when she attempts to show that all of the employer's 
non-discriminatory explanations are pretextual."); Thomas, 131 F.3d at 202 ("The plaintiff 
often will - quite reasonably - argue both alternatives."); HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR., CIVIL 
RIGHTS & EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 243 (1997); cf George Rutherglen, Recon­
sidering Burdens of Proof' Ideology, Evidence, and Intent in Individual Claims of Employ­
ment Discrimination, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 43, 65 (1993) (explaining that the issues in 
pretext and mixed motivation cases are so similar that "it is difficult to imagine a case that 
presents one but not the other"; in such cases, "there is little in the way of legal doctrine that 
saves the jury from confusing instructions on the arcane distinction between pretext and 
mixed motivation"); Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate 
Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 603-04 (1996) (stating that, if the 
dichotomy continues to exist, "judges will be hard pressed to create jury instructions that 
make sense") (hereinafter Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure). 
43. Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: 
A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51  MERCER L. REV. 651 (2000). 
44. Fields v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 115 
F.3d 1 16, 123 (2d Cir. 1997). 
45. Id. at 124. 
46. Id. at 124 n.4. 
47. See id. 
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ply "shorthand," the court said, for requesting an additional instruc­
tion concerning the same-decision defense.48 
As the following discussion illustrates, Congress and the Price 
Waterhouse Court thought they lowered the McDonnell Douglas­
Burdine bar by allowing a class of discrimination plaintiffs to bypass 
the complex burden-shifting scheme and jump straight to the "moti­
vating factor" test. Stated differently, where a plaintiff could demon­
strate discriminatory animus without relying on an inference from pre­
text, Congress intended to enable her to establish the defendant's 
liability simply by showing that the animus was a motivating factor in 
the employer's decision. Fields frustrates this effort by compressing 
the complex McDonnell Douglas-Burdine scheme into a simple moti­
vating factor test49 while leaving an additional obstacle - the same­
decision defense - in the path of mixed-motive plaintiffs. The result is 
a paradox that directly contradicts congressional intent. 
Even as it insists that the CRA did not erase the distinction be­
tween pretext and mixed-motive claims, the Fields court nonetheless 
uses the motivating factor analysis to inform its understanding of -
indeed, to simplify - McDonnell Douglas-Burdine pretext claims. 
With pretext and mixed-motive claims now measured in the Second 
Circuit by the same motivating factor standard, Fields concludes that 
only mixed-motive plaintiffs, not pretext plaintiffs, must overcome a 
same-decision showing by the defendant. Thus, although Congress in­
tended to use the motivating factor test to make discrimination claims 
easier for mixed-motive plaintiffs,5° Fields actually makes it easier for 
plaintiffs to succeed in pretext cases than in mixed-motive cases. The 
Second Circuit is hardly to blame for this absurd development, since it 
was merely trapped on the tortuous path forged by the Court, by 
Congress, and by other lower courts. Thus far, the Court has made no 
effort to clear the muddle, leaving parties, attorneys, judges, and juries 
hopelessly confused.51 
This Note argues that courts should jettison their efforts to under­
stand the arcane pretext/mixed-motive distinction and should focus in-
48. Id. 
49. According to the Fields court, a pretext instruction simply asks the jury whether an 
impermissible reason was a motivating factor in the employment decision. See supra text ac­
companying notes 46-47. 
50. See infra text accompanying note 94; cf. Christopher Y. Chen, Note, Rethinking the 
Direct Evidence Requirement: A Suggested Approach in Analyzing Mixed-Motives Discrimi­
nation Claims, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 907 (2001) ("Price Waterhouse is significant . . .  be­
cause it potentially affords plaintiffs more favorable standards of liability." (internal foot­
note omitted)). 
51. See Kaighn Smith, How Do We Work This? Making Sense of the Liability Standard 
in "Disparate Treatment" Employment Discrimination Cases, MAINE BAR J., Jan. 1999, 34, 
37 ("If all this seems unwieldy to lawyers, consider the problems in fashioning comprehensi­
ble instructions for juries. As the courts struggle to make the law coherent, appellate chal­
lenges to jury instructions have become commonplace."). 
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stead on the question at the heart of every discrimination case: the 
motives of the employer.52 Part I discusses the Court's decision in 
Price Waterhouse, then turns to the plain language of the CRA to ar­
gue that the statute's text requires abandoning the pretext/mixed­
motive distinction. Part I also examines the legislative history of the 
CRA and concludes that, because Congress's intent is highly ambigu­
ous, the text of the statute best guides courts' understandings of the 
Act. Part II proposes a set of jury instructions consistent with the spirit 
of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine and the text of the CRA. These in­
structions clear the mixed-motive muddle for juries and make the par­
ties' task in employment discrimination cases more apparent from the 
outset. Part II explains that these instructions are grounded in the text 
of Title VII, and that they represent an extension of efforts by courts 
and scholars to simplify this area of the law. By making this inquiry 
the touchstone for analyzing individual disparate treatment claims, 
courts can devise a simple standard that allows parties on both sides of 
the employment relationship to conform their behavior with the law. 
I. MAKING (NON)SENSE OF IT ALL: 
PRICE WATERHOUSE AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 
The ordered chaos that surrounds mixed-motive claims and indi­
vidual disparate treatment law in general is in large part attributable 
to the ambiguous language of the Supreme Court and Congress. Sec­
tion I.A examines the Supreme Court's splintered opinion in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,53 with particular attention to the plurality 
opinion by Justice Brennan and Justice O'Connor's concurrence. Sec­
tion LB then considers Congress's reaction to the decision in the 
CRA, looking first to the plain language of the statute for guidance in 
understanding its meaning. Section LB argues that fidelity to the text 
of the CRA commands abandoning the obscure pretext/mixed-motive 
52. Many commentators have grappled with the direct evidence requirement, the 
pretext/mixed-motive distinction, and the difficulties of instructing a jury given the confused 
state of employment law. See, e.g., Belton, supra note 43; Susan Bisom-Rapp, Of Motives 
and Maleness: A Critical View of Mixed Motive Doctrine in Title Vil Sex Discrimination 
Cases, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1029 (1995); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, 
Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703 
(1995); Rutherglen, supra note 42; Smith, supra note 51, at 34; Michael J. Zimmer, Pretext 
and Mixed Motive After the 1991 Act, N.J. L.J., Dec. 5, 1994, at 11 [hereinafter Zimmer, Pre­
text and Mixed Motive]; Chen, supra note 50; Kelley E. Dowd, Casenote, The Correct Appli­
cation of the Evidentiary Standard in Title VII Mixed-Motive Cases: Stacks v. Southwestern 
Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1095 (1995); Steven M. Tindall, Note, Do as 
She Does, Not as She Says: The Shortcomings of Justice O'Connor's Direct Evidence Re­
quirement in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 332 (1996); 
Joseph J. Ward, Note, A Call for Price Waterhouse II: The Legacy of Justice O'Connor's Di­
rect Evidence Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Claims, 61 ALB. L. 
REV. 627 (1997); Zubrensky, supra note 35. 
53. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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distinction in favor of the test laid out by the statute. Finally, Section 
1.C searches the legislative history of the 1991 Act for some expression 
of Congress's intent, ultimately finding no clear legislative intention. 
Part I concludes that, in the absence of an unambiguous legislative in­
tent to the contrary, the controlling test in this area should derive from 
the statute's plain language. 
A. Price Waterhouse, Mixed Motives, and the Direct Evidence 
Requirement 
The Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse crystallized the 
distinction between pretext and mixed-motive claims under Title VII. 
Section I.A examines the decision and provides a context for 
Congress's reaction to the case two years later in the CRA. This Sec­
tion reveals that a majority of the Court did not agree that direct evi­
dence should be the touchstone in mixed-motive cases, and that the 
opinion provides little guidance for the lower courts. 
The facts of Price Waterhouse illustrate the dual motivations that 
typically exist in mixed-motive claims. Ann Hopkins had worked for 
five years at Price Waterhouse's Office of Government Services when 
she was nominated for partnership.s4 Hopkins was highly qualified for 
the position: other partners in the office described her as "an out­
standing professional" with "strong character, independence, and in­
tegrity," and they praised her "key role" in landing a multimillion 
dollar contract with the State Department.ss But Hopkins's co-workers 
sometimes perceived her aggressive style as abrasive and brusque, and 
even the partners who supported her candidacy admitted that she was 
sometimes impatient and unduly harsh.s6 
As the Price Waterhouse plurality noted, however, there were signs 
that some partners reacted negatively to Hopkins's aggressive person­
ality because she was a woman.s 7 Some of the partners, for example, 
felt that she "overcompensated for being a woman" by acting "ma­
cho," and that she needed to take "a course at charm school."s8 As a 
result, the Policy Board placed Hopkins's candidacy on hold, advising 
her that to improve her chances she should "walk more femininely, 
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her 
hair styled, and wear jewelry."s9 
54. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233. 
55. Id. at 234. 
56. Id. at 234-35. 
57. Id. at 235; cf Bisom-Rapp, supra note 52, at 1041-42. 
58. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. 
59. Id. 
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In assessing Hopkins's discrimination claim, Justice Brennan, 
writing for the four-justice plurality, began by examining the language 
of Title VII, which prohibits employers from discriminating against 
any individual "because of" his or her race, color, religion, sex, or na­
tional origin.60 Justice Brennan concluded that the "because of" lan­
guage means that sex "must be irrelevant to employment decisions."61 
In other words, Title VII condemns even those employment decisions 
that are based on legitimate considerations if an impermissible factor 
was also considered.62 
Given that a Title VII violation exists whenever the employer has 
considered a protected characteristic, the plurality then laid out its 
two-part mixed-motive analysis. First, the plaintiff must show that the 
protected characteristic - in Price Waterhouse, sex - "played a moti­
vating part" in the challenged employment decision.63 Once the plain­
tiff discharges this burden, the employer can present an affirmative de­
fense and "avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would 
have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play 
such a role."64 Thus, this affirmative defense, which has come to be 
called the "same-decision defense,"65 allows the employer to escape 
liability altogether by showing that leaving the unlawful variable out 
of the equation would not have changed the final outcome. 
The plurality opinion made clear that plaintiffs retain a degree of 
flexibility in bringing mixed-motive claims. Justice Brennan stated in a 
footnote that a plaintiff's case need not be pigeonholed from the be­
ginning as either a pretext or a mixed-motives case.66 Rather, the dis­
trict court can wait until some point after discovery before it decides, 
based on all the evidence presented, whether the case involves mixed 
motives.6 7 Justice Brennan also indicated that he saw no meaningful 
60. Id. at 239; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). 
61. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240. 
62. Id. at 241. 
63. Id. at 244. 
64. Id. at 244-45. The plurality borrowed this framework from Mt. Healthy City Board of 
Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1977), where the Court held that once a plaintiff 
has shown that an exercise of a First Amendment liberty was a "substantial" or "motivating 
factor" in an adverse employment decision, the employer must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that it would have reached the same decision in the absence of such protected 
conduct. This framework has also been employed by the Court in the context of protected 
labor conduct, see NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), and where unconsti­
tutional motives allegedly contributed to the enactment of legislation, see Arlington Heights 
v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Pointing to these previous cases, Justice 
Brennan concluded that mixed-motive analysis constitutes "a well-worn path." Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250. 
65. See infra note 103 and accompanying text .. 
66. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 n.12. 
67. Id. 
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difference between the level of proof required by the plurality and 
that required by Justice O'Connor.68 Responding to Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence, which required direct evidence of discrimi­
nation to trigger the mixed-motive analysis, the plurality noted that it 
was not suggesting "a limitation on the possible ways of proving that 
stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment decision." 69 
Justice Brennan also refrained from deciding "which specific facts, 
'standing alone,' would or would not establish a plaintiff's case . . . .  " 70 
In other words, the plurality declined to limit the nature of proof re­
quired in mixed-motive cases to "direct evidence," but instead left 
available to plaintiffs a range of evidence that could be adduced to 
support an employee's case. 
Justice White's concurrence71 reveals that a majority of the Price 
Waterhouse Court - the four-justice plurality and Justice White -
did not require direct evidence in order to trigger mixed-motive analy­
sis.72 In Justice White's view, the Court should simply look to Mt. 
Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle,73 which employed a "sub­
stantial" or "motivating factor" test, in devising a mixed-motive test 
for the employment context. His concurrence made no reference to 
the nature of evidence required of the plaintiff. Justice White did, 
however, state that a broad range of evidence could be introduced by 
the defendant in proving the same-decision defense, indicating that he 
did not wish to restrict parties in employment discrimination cases to 
certain types of evidence. 74 
Like Justice White, Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality that 
the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer to make out a 
same-decision defense.75 Justice O'Connor noted that the mixed-
68. Id. at 250 n.13. 
69. Id. at 251-52. 
70. Id. at 252. 
71. Id. at 258-61 (White, J., concurring). 
72. See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The re­
quirement of 'direct evidence' was not . . .  adopted either by the plurality of four or by Jus­
tice White, so there was not majority support for this proposition."). But see supra note 34. 
73. 429 U.S. 247, 287 (1977). Mt. Healthy applied the mixed-motive framework to em­
ployment decisions motivated by an employee's exercise of his or her First Amendment 
rights. See supra note 64 (explaining the application of the mixed-motive analysis in various 
contexts). 
74. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260-61 (White, J., concurring). 
75. Id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This Note does not aim to provide a detailed 
analysis of Justice O'Connor's concurrence; other commentators have exhaustively com­
pleted this task. For the most thorough account, see Tindall, supra note 52. See also Ward , 
supra note 52; Zubrensky, supra note 35. Rather, this Note briefly summarizes Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence in order to shed light on the fact that the lower courts have incor­
rectly applied the direct evidence requirement, converting mixed-motive analysis into a 
quagmire that most plaintiffs opt to circumvent. 
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motive framework laid out by the Court should be considered a "sup­
plement" to the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting 
scheme.76 Employing slightly different rhetoric from the plurality, Jus­
tice O'Connor stated that once the plaintiff has established that a dis­
criminatory animus was a "substantial factor" in its decision, the de­
fendant may be required to show that "despite the smoke, there is no 
fire."77 In other words, the plaintiff cannot simply infer a discrimina­
tory animus from "discrimination in the air."78 Instead, the plaintiff 
must, as in a tort case, show causation - that the defendant's imper­
missible consideration of a protected characteristic proximately caused 
the adverse employment decision.79 
Justice O'Connor departed from the plurality, however, in requir­
ing a specific nature of evidence in mixed-motive cases. In her view, 
the plaintiff must present "direct evidence" that an impermissible con­
sideration was a substantial factor in the employer's decision in order 
to shift the burden to the defendant.80 Justice O'Connor explained that 
the "strong showing of illicit motivation" she would require could not 
consist merely of "stray remarks in the workplace" or "statements by 
decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself. "81 Beyond 
this negative definition, however, Justice O'Connor offered no precise 
delineation of her "direct evidence" terminology. 
The direct evidence requirement perplexes the lower courts, who 
inconsistently apply it.82 Few can decipher precisely what Justice 
O'Connor meant by "direct evidence," and a handful are not certain 
that such a requirement should exist at all.83 Some commentators have 
suggested, after closely examining the facts in Price Waterhouse, that 
76. Id. Thus, a majority of the Court agreed in Price Waterhouse that the mixed-motive 
analysis was distinct from the more familiar McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework. 
77. Id. at 266. 
78. Id. at 251 (plurality opinion) (quoting an expression used by the petitioner, Price 
Waterhouse). 
79. Id. at 266 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
80. Id. at 276. 
81. Id. at 276, 277. 
82. Justice Kennedy, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, 
presciently predicted, " [t)oday the Court manipulates existing and complex rules for em­
ployment discrimination cases in a way certain to result in confusion." Price Waterhouse, 490 
U.S. 228, 279 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He added: "Courts will also be required to 
make the often subtle and difficult distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' or 'circumstan­
tial evidence. Lower courts long have had difficulty applying McDonnell Douglas and 
Burdine. Addition of a second burden-shifting mechanism . . .  is not likely to lend clarity to 
the process." Id. at 291. The dissenters argued that the existing McDonnell Douglas frame­
work could adequately accommodate mixed-motive claims such as Hopkins's without creat­
ing a new burden-shifting structure. See id. at 286-87. 
83. See, e.g. , Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1 176, 1 183 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The 
requirement of 'direct evidence' was not . . .  adopted either by the plurality or by Justice 
White, so there was not majority support for this proposition."). But see supra note 34. 
248 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:234 
Justice O'Connor did not mean "direct evidence" in the traditional, 
strict meaning of the term,84 but rather implied a broader connotation 
of the term that includes circumstantial evidence tied closely to the ac­
tual employment decision in question.BS Regardless of what Justice 
O'Connor meant by "direct evidence,'' Price Waterhouse remains rife 
with ambiguity.B6 Thus, Section I.B proposes abandoning the decision's 
unclear language in favor of a more straightforward text - the CRA. 
B. The Plain Language of the Civil Rights Act 
This Section recommends avoiding the muddle created in Price 
Waterhouse by adhering to Congress's plain language. It begins by de­
scribing the events that prompted enactment of the CRA and then 
analyzes the text itse1f.B7 It concludes by offering the CRA's legislative 
history as a justification for textual fidelity. 
1. The 1991 Act: Congress Responds to the Supreme Court 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was largely Congress's response to a 
handful of 1989 Supreme Court decisions that the civil rights commu­
nity viewed as hostile to employment discrimination plaintiffs.BB In 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,B9 for example, the Court altered 
disparate impact analysis and retreated from the "business necessity" 
requirement.90 And in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,91 the Court 
84. See BLACK'S LA w DICTIONARY 577 (7th ed. 1999) ("Evidence that is based on per­
sonal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presump­
tion."). But see JOHN H. WIGMORE, A STUDENTS' TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
40 (1935) (explaining that the term "has no utility" because it is "sometimes used to mean 
testimonial evidence in general, but sometimes also limited to apply only to testimony di­
rectly asserting the fact-in-issue"). 
85. See Tindall, supra note 52, at 354 ("From the clues in her opinion, it seems that when 
Justice O'Connor required direct evidence she meant evidence of a decisionmaker's words 
that show animus toward the plaintiff's protected class which is related to the adverse em­
ployment decision."). This comports more with the reading adopted by the courts in the 
animus-plus camp than with the classic view. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text. 
86. Cf. Thomas v. Nat'! Football League Players Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 203 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) ("As an initial matter, it should be noted that Justice O'Connor's concurrence was one 
of six votes supporting the Court's judgment . . .  so that it is far from clear that Justice 
O'Connor's opinion, in which no other Justice joined, should be taken as establishing prece­
dent. Justice White's concurring opinion makes no mention of 'direct' evidence, nor does the 
plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan." (citations omitted)). 
87. See generally William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 621 
(1990) ("The statute's text is the most important consideration in statutory interpretation, 
and a clear text ought to be given effect."). 
88. See supra note 23 (citing cases and stating holdings). 
89. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
90. Prior to Wards Cove, the burden of persuasion in disparate impact cases, see supra 
note 9, rested initially with the plaintiff. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 
(1971). Once the plaintiff proved that a disparate impact was caused by a facially neutral 
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held that § 1981, which protects against racial discrimination in the 
making and enforcement of contracts, does not bar discrimination in 
the performance of contracts.92 
Congress reacted quickly to these decisions. Within a year, legisla­
tors introduced the Civil Rights Act of 1990, which they termed an 
"omnibus legislative response to judicial interpretations of Title 
VII." 93 One of the Act's chief purposes was to "respond to the 
Supreme Court's recent decisions by restoring the civil rights protec­
tions that were dramatically limited by those decisions."94 With these 
statements, Congress expressly declared that Price Waterhouse and its 
companion decisions motivated the legislation. 
Despite its rapid start, the proposed bill quickly became controver­
sial, and passage proved difficult.95 The business community in par­
ticular launched a stiff resistance to the legislation, and President Bush 
vetoed the first 1990 version of the bill.96 After Congress incorporated 
the compromise provisions demanded by the White House,9 7  President 
Bush signed the legislation, which went into effect in 1991.98 
employment device, the burden shifted to the defendant to show that the challenged practice 
was both job related and a business necessity - i.e., that the device was essential for the em­
ployer to be able to identify qualified employees. Id. Wards Cove altered this analysis by 
holding that the burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. 490 U.S. at 659. 
Wards Cove also weakened the business necessity requirement, stating that "there is no re­
quirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's 
business to pass muster." Id. Congress abrogated Wards Cove and reinstated the Griggs 
standard in the CRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) (1994). 
91.  491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
92. See id. at 171. Section 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), protects the right to make and 
enforce contracts without discrimination on the basis of race or ancestry. See LARSON, supra 
note 1, at § 101.01. Civil rights activists viewed Patterson as particularly pernicious because 
of the effect it had among the lower courts, which interpreted the decision to mean that any 
conduct by the employer after the formation of the contract - including termination and 
retaliation - could not be covered by § 1981. See, e.g. , McCarthy v. Kemper Life Ins. Co., 
924 F.2d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 1991); Hayes v. Cmty. Gen. Osteopathic Hosp., 940 F.2d 54, 56 
(3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1060 (1992); see also LARSON, supra note 1, at 
§ 101.01 (4]. 
93. CHARLES DALE, LEGAL ANALYSIS OF S.2104 AND H.R. 4000: THE 'CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1990' (1990). 
94. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-856, at 1 (1990). 
95. See DAVID A. CATHCART ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 2 (1993). 
96. 136 CONG. REC. 31,827-28 (1990) (reprinting President Bush's veto message, which 
cited concerns about hiring quotas as the primary reason for vetoing the legislation). 
97. CATHCART ET AL., supra note 95, at 14-15, state that the chief area of compromise 
in the 1991 Act was the provisions related to disparate impact claims and Wards Cove. 
98. See THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF 1991: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY i (Douglas s. McDowell 
ed., 1992). Because much of the text of the proposed 1990 Act remained intact in the en­
acted CRA of 1991 - and because the debate over the two bills encompassed many of the 
same issues - this Note treats the legislative history of the 1990 Act as relevant to, and in­
deed part of, the history of the 1991 Act. See CHARLES DALE, H.R.l, THE 'CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1991,' THE ADMINISTRATION'S CIVIL RIGHTS BILL (H.R. 1375 AND S.611), AND 
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The CRA instituted a number of major reforms in employment 
discrimination law. Most notably, the Act made jury trials and com­
pensatory and punitive damages available for claims of alleged inten­
tional discrimination under Title VII and the Americans with Disabili­
ties Act.99 The Act also overturned Wards Cove, establishing that 
when a plaintiff proves that an employment practice has a disparate 
impact on a protected class, the employer must show that the practice 
is both job related and a business necessity.100 The CRA also over­
turned Patterson by amending § 1981 to prohibit racial discrimination 
in the performance of contracts.101 Congress responded to Price 
Waterhouse in two principal portions of the CRA, which the following 
Section examines. 
2. The Text 
Two provisions of the 1991 Act stand at the center of this Note. 
First, § 2000e-2(m) (the "motivating factor provision") codifies the 
motivating factor test that a majority of the Price Waterhouse Court 
endorsed: 
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employ­
ment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates 
that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor 
for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated 
the practice.102 
This section of the statute makes clear that an employer violates Title 
VII whenever it considers an illicit reason in its decision process, irre­
spective of whether it would have made the same decision absent the 
illegal consideration. In this respect, the CRA substantially comports 
with Price Waterhouse's holding. 
The Act goes on, however, to depart from Price Waterhouse in not 
allowing employers to escape entirely from liability by explaining that 
they would have made the same decision absent the impermissible 
consideration. Under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (the "same-decision provi­
sion"),103 if the defendant succeeds on the same-decision defense, the 
THE FINAL CONFERENCE VERSION OF S.2104 OF THE lOlST CONGRESS: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON ( 1991 ). 
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1 981 (b)-(c) (1994). Such relief had previously been available only to vic­
tims of racial and ethnic discrimination under § 1 981. Thus, prior to the CRA, Title VII af­
forded victims of sex discrimination only equitable relief. See CATHCART ET AL., supra note 
95, at 2. 
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994). 
101 .  42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (proscribing discrimination in the "making, performance, 
modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, 
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship"). 
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994). 
103. The same-decision provision provides: 
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plaintiff is not entitled to reinstatement, back pay, or compensatory or 
punitive damages. A plaintiff who has successfully shown liability un­
der the motivating factor provision, however, does receive declaratory 
and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees and costs, regardless of 
the defendant's success on the same-decision defense.'04 Thus, while 
Congress essentially ratified Price Waterhouse's structure with respect 
to the plaintiff's burden in establishing the defendant's liability, it 
overturned the decision to the extent that it allowed employers com­
pletely to escape liability with the affirmative defense. 
In the task of statutory construction, many judges and scholars 
hold that the text, not the illusory intent of the legislature, controls in­
terpretation.105 At its broadest level, the "textualist" approach follows 
the maxim of Oliver Wendell Holmes, who wrote, "[w]e do not in­
quire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute 
means."106 Although this quotable passage expresses the sentiment of 
textualists generally, it does not accurately reflect the views of all who 
claim that a statute's text is paramount in its interpretation. 
Long before Justice Antonin Scalia's views rose to prominence, 
courts practiced a fidelity to statutes' language that some scholars now 
term "traditional" textualism.107 Under the traditional approach, a 
statute's "plain meaning" governed "its interpretation, unless negated 
by strongly contradictory legislative history."108 In other words, where 
a statute was unambiguous, the court followed its plain meaning. In 
the event of ambiguous language, however, legislative history could 
control the decision.109 Indeed, legislative history could even trump 
statutory language that appeared on its face to be plainly to the con­
trary.110 
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title 
and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the 
absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court -
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and 
attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a 
claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and 
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, 
hiring, promotion, or payment . . . .  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
104. Id.; see also CATHCART ET AL., supra note 95, at 31 (1993). 
105. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 14-41 (1997). See generally Eskridge, supra note 87 (discussing the textualist 
approach). 
106. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 
417, 419 (1899). 
107. See, e.g. , Eskridge, supra note 87, at 624. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 624, 628. 
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Justice Scalia's views on statutory interpretation largely supplanted 
the traditional textualist approach with his elevation to the Supreme 
Court in the late 1980s. Professor Eskridge, who charts Justice Scalia's 
rejection of the "old" textualism in the Justice's early Supreme Court 
opinions, terms the nascent approach "new textualism."111 The new 
textualism begins with the premise that "[t]he text is the law, and it is 
the text that must be observed."112 In Justice Scalia's view, the putative 
legislative intent is not as important as what the statutory language it­
self means.113 A statute's legislative history, he claims, should not be 
the dispositive signal of the statute's meaning, because the legislature 
is a body of individual lawmakers who cannot share a collective in­
tent.114 Indeed, in most instances, no legislative intent exists at all, be­
cause few of the legislators gave any thought to the particular issue in 
question.115 
Instead of attempting to divine meaning from the actions of inde­
pendently minded legislators, then, the new textualists maintain that 
the interpreter of a statute should focus on the context of the legisla­
tion and the meaning that the statute's language carried at the time it 
was enacted.116 The new textualists also strive to accord their reading 
of a statute with the surrounding body of law in which it is located.11 7 
The new textualists deviate from the statutory language only when 
"literally" interpreting the statute would produce "an absurd, and 
perhaps unconstitutional, result."118 Stated differently, the new textu-
1 1 1. Id. at 623. 
1 12. SCALIA, supra note 105, at 22. 
1 13. See id. at 23. 
114. See id. at 29-30, 32; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in 
Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 60 (1988) ("Congress votes on the 
bill, not on the reports. No one can vote against a report, and the President cannot veto the 
language of a report."); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Govern­
mental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 438 (1996) ("Consider 
that each legislator possesses a complex mix of hopes, expectations, beliefs, and attitudes. It 
is not obvious which of these mental states, or combination of them, constitutes her essential 
intent for legislation."). 
115. SCALIA, supra note 105, at 32 ("[W]ith respect to 99.99 percent of the issues of con­
struction reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent," because, "[f]or a virtual cer­
tainty, the majority was blissfully unaware of the existence of the issue, much less had any 
preference as to how it should be resolved."). 
1 16. See SCALIA, supra note 105, at 37; see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 
U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
1 17. Green, 490 U.S. at 528; see also Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Interpreting the Americans with 
Disabilities Act: The Trials of Textualism and the Practical Limits of Practical Reason, 74 
TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1212 (2000) ("[T]he statutory text itself may contain inconsistencies and 
ambiguities that require resolution. But for the textualist, such difficulties are resolved 
through careful consideration of the statutory structure as a whole and the relationship be­
tween the particular statutory provision and the rest of the legislatively enacted code." (in­
ternal citations omitted)). 
118. Green, 490 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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alists look to a statute's legislative history only when its plain language 
suggests a strangled meaning that the legislature could not have 
meant, either as a matter of common sense or as a matter of constitu­
tional principles.119 
This Note argues that both modes of interpretation - the tradi­
tional and the new textualism - command an approach to disparate 
treatment claims that the courts have not followed. The new textual­
ists, of course, would look to the CRA's text and no further, unless the 
resulting understanding of the statute was preposterous or unconstitu­
tional. According to the plain language of the motivating factor provi­
sion, an employer violates Title VII anytime it allows a protected 
characteristic to serve as a "motivating factor" in an employment deci­
sion. The text draws no distinction between direct and circumstantial 
evidence, or between pretext and mixed-motive claims. Rather, it 
speaks in plain terms, suggesting that a motivating factor test controls 
all discrimination claims. Thus, reading the CRA's provisions as cre­
ating a uniform approach to disparate treatment claims - a motivat­
ing factor test - is neither absurd nor unconstitutional. 
At least one court to have contemplated the possibility that the 
text of the CRA erases the pretext/mixed-motive distinction, however, 
disagrees with this conclusion. In Watson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority,120 the Third Circuit considered both the text 
and the legislative history of the 1991 Act and concluded that the Act 
did not erase the pretext/mixed-motive distinction. The Watson court 
began its analysis by examining the text of the motivating factor provi­
sion, which it read as a reaction to Price Waterhouse.121 The court 
noted that the section prohibits any employment decision in which a 
protected characteristic was a motivating factor, "even though other 
factors also motivated this practice."122 The quoted language, the 
Watson court stated, suggests that Congress intended to target specifi­
cally those cases in which multiple factors motivated the defendant 
119. Cf Stephen M. Gill, Comment, The Perfect Textualist Statute: Interpreting the Per­
manent Resident Alien Provision of28 U.S. C. § 1332, 75 TUL. L. REV. 481, 500-01 (2000). 
To be sure, the textualist approach is not without its critics. See generally Ronald 
Dworkin, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 105, at 1 15; Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in 
SCALIA, supra note 105, at 95; Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 105, at 
65. Some empirical evidence suggests that the new textualism simply does not work as 
promised. See, e.g., James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from Judges In­
terpreting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 39-109 (1994); George H. Taylor, Tex­
tualism at Work, 44 DEPAUL L.  REV. 259, 319-80 (1995). Others simply suggest that the no­
tion of a textualist approach is conceptually impossible. See Paul E. McGreal, There is No 
Such Thing as Textualism: A Case Study in Constitutional Method, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2393 (2001). Although this Note recognizes the force of these criticisms, it nonetheless ad­
heres to the text of the CRA for the reasons articulated above. 
120. 207 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2000). 
121. Watson, 207 F.3d at 217. 
122. 41 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994). 
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(i.e., mixed-motive cases); otherwise, it simply would have spoken in 
broad terms without bothering to insert the superfluous language.123 
The court also stated that the use of the term "demonstrates" in the 
motivating factor provision correlates with Justice O'Connor's use of 
the same term in her Price Waterhouse concurrence - a correlation 
too close to be coincidental. 124 
The Watson court offered further support for its conclusion that 
the pretext/mixed-motive distinction remains intact after the CRA. 
Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (the same-decision provision) limits the 
damages available against a defendant that, though liable under the 
motivating factor provision, can show it would have reached the same 
decision absent the impermissible consideration.125 The Third Circuit 
in Watson noted that § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)'s affirmative defense is avail­
able only where the defendant is liable under the motivating factor 
provision - not under § 2000e-2(a), the general disparate treatment 
provision that defines unlawful employment practices by employers.126 
If Congress intended to create a new standard of causation for all in­
dividual disparate claims, the court reasoned, it would have drafted 
the same-decision provision to apply to all such cases, not simply those 
under the motivating factor provision.127 Thus, because claims under 
the motivating factor provision entail their own special defense, they 
must differ inherently from claims under the general disparate treat­
ment provision. 
The conclusions in Watson, though insightful, do not undermine 
the new textualist reasoning this Note adopts. The Watson court sug­
gested that Congress intended in the CRA to address only those cases 
in which multiple factors, not just a discriminatory animus, motivated 
the employer, suggesting that the bulk of cases would still fall under 
the general disparate treatment provision (§ 2000e-2(a)). In the mod­
ern workplace, however, an employer is rarely motivated solely by a 
discriminatory impulse. Rather, an amalgam of factors, both conscious 
123. Watson, 207 F.3d at 2 17. 
1 24. Id. Justice O'Connor used the word "demonstrates" throughout her opinion. E.g. , 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 275 ( 1 989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (charac­
terizing case as one in which "the employee has demonstrated by direct evidence that an il­
legitimate factor played a substantial role"); id. at 276-77 ("[The employer] must demon­
strate that with the illegitimate factor removed from the calculus, sufficient business reasons 
would have induced it to take the same employment action."). The Watson court called these 
passages "key portions" of Justice O'Connor's opinion, Watson, 207 F.3d at 217, but in the 
places where she stated her central holding, Justice O'Connor used different terminology. 
See, e.g. , Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 278 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Under my ap­
proach, the plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to show that an illegitimate criterion 
was a substantial factor . . . .  " (emphasis added)). Thus, the Third Circuit's analysis is 
strained. 
125. See supra note 103 (quoting the text of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). 
126. Watson, 207 F.3d at 218. 
127. Id. 
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and unconscious, often explains a discriminatory employment deci­
sion.128 The CRA may simply recognize that it is increasingly difficult 
for plaintiffs to show that a discriminatory animus was the singular 
reason for their dismissal (or nonpromotion, etc.). Rather than sup­
planting the general disparate treatment provision, then, Congress 
supplemented that provision with one that recognizes the evolving na­
ture of discrimination cases. The old provision remains available for 
plaintiffs who choose to use it, but the new one can be used by both 
"pretext" and "mixed-motive" plaintiffs. 
From the new textualist perspective, the principal problem with 
Watson is that the court attempted to discern Congress's intent from 
the language it used rather than examining the language on its own 
terms. On its face, the motivating factor provision does not limit itself 
to mixed-motive cases; it simply includes cases where multiple factors 
motivated the employer.129 And although new textualists look to the 
structure of a statute to determine whether a reading of its language is 
excessively strained, the Watson court's structural arguments do not 
defeat this Note's textualist reading. The fact that the same-decision 
defense is attached only to the motivating factor provision and not to 
the general disparate treatment provision means nothing. If Congress 
anticipated that the motivating factor provision would be used princi­
pally by mixed-motive plaintiffs, then it logically would have attached 
the same-decision defense only to that provision, rather than also al­
tering the general disparate treatment provision. That legislative deci­
sion by no means requires that § 2000e-2(m) be used exclusively by 
mixed-motive plaintiffs. Thus, the Watson court's arguments do not 
sufficiently demonstrate that reading the CRA as creating a uniform 
motivating factor standard for all disparate treatment claims is some­
how absurd or unconstitutional. 
This Note does not stop, however, with a new textualist interpreta­
tion. Good sense counsels that, in addition to the plain text, a glance at 
128. See, e.g., Bisom-Rapp, supra note 52, at 1039 (recognizing "the causal relationship 
between the legitimate and discriminatory motives" and explaining that "fact finders may 
have difficulty seeing that the discriminatory motive may indeed have directly contributed to 
the 'legitimate' motive, where the latter is, for example, the deterioration of the plaintiff's 
performance"). Some scholars, including Bisom-Rapp, have suggested that the causal rela­
tionship between "legitimate" and "discriminatory" motives merits jettisoning an intent­
based approach to discrimination claims. Bisom-Rapp, supra, at 1()40 (recommending the 
abandonment of the same-decision text in favor of an approach that examines overall evi­
dence of discrimination, irrespective of employer claims); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, 
The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal 
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1 161, 1161-66 (1995) (arguing that current dis­
parate treatment theory is inadequate because it assumes that discrimination is motivational, 
rather than cognitive, in origin). 
129. For the language of the motivating factor provision, see supra text accompanying 
note 102. 
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legislative history may occasionally be merited.13° Thus, this Note also 
employs the methods of traditional textualism, considering the lan­
guage of the CRA in light of its history in order to determine, if possi­
ble, Congress's intentions in enacting the statute. As the following 
Section indicates, the ambiguity of this legislative history provides ad­
ditional support for abiding by the plain language of the CRA. 
C. Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act 
According to the traditional textualist approach, unless the history 
of the CRA points in another direction, the text of the statute sets 
forth a simple motivating factor test that controls all Title VII individ­
ual disparate treatment claims. This Section turns to that history in or­
der to determine the changes Congress intended to effect in enacting 
the motivating factor provision. In light of the decidedly ambiguous 
legislative history, this Section concludes that the textualist reading 
outlined above, which does not include the direct evidence require­
ment, is not inconsistent with Congress's intent. The Section next con­
siders Congress's intentions with respect to the continued distinction 
between pretext and mixed-motive claims, again concluding that the 
vague statutory history does not preclude elimination of the distinc­
tion. 
1 .  Legislative History of the Direct Evidence Requirement 
An examination of the legislative history of the CRA reveals that 
Congress was largely silent regarding Justice O'Connor's direct evi­
dence requirement. That silence, however, is not the only puzzling as­
pect of the statute's history. Although the CRA headlined the legisla­
tive agenda in 1990 and 1991, little traditional legislative history 
accompanies the Act.131 As was the case with the original passage of 
Title VII in 1964, the 1991 Act was a quickly adopted compromise that 
followed extended debate over prior drafts, with few committee 
hearings or reports and little floor debate on the final version.132 
130. See, e.g., Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 (1962) ("The decisions of this 
Court have repeatedly warned against the dangers of an approach to statutory construction 
which confines itself to the bare words of a statute, for 'literalness may strangle meaning.' " 
(citations omitted)). 
131. See CATHCART ET AL., supra note 95, at 7. 
132. See id. Cathcart explains that three primary sources of legislative history exist for 
the CRA: (1) the CRA of 1 990; (2) various interpretative memoranda entered into the 
Congressional Record by Senators and Representatives; and (3) a three-paragraph Interpre­
tive Memorandum entered by Senator Danforth, providing, " [n]o statements other than the 
interpretive memorandum . . .  shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any 
way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to 
Wards Cove - Business necessity/cumulation/alternative practice." Id. at 7-8 (quoting 137 
CONG. REC. S15276 (Oct. 25, 1991) (Interpretive Memorandum)). 
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Moreover, the legislative history that does exist focuses heavily on 
provisions of the Act not pertinent to this Note, with less attention 
paid to Price Waterhouse and the provision that affects it - § 2000e-
2(m). In those areas in which the legislators discuss mixed-motive 
analysis, they mention a requirement of direct evidence only once, and 
that cursory remark is hardly dispositive. As a result, combing the leg­
islative history to discern Congress's intent regarding direct evidence 
becomes largely a task of inference from silence.133 
Although the legislators failed to articulate precisely what kind of 
evidence they would require of mixed-motive plaintiffs, the legislative 
history suggests that they did not intend for the requirement to be as 
stringent as some circuits have demanded. In the Conference Report 
accompanying the 1990 Act, the Conferees expressed their intention 
"to restore the rule applied by the majority of circuits prior to the 
Price Waterhouse decision that any discrimination that is actually 
shown to play a role in a contested employment decision may be the 
subject of liability."134 The Conferees went on to state: 
Conduct or statements are relevant under this test only if the plaintiff 
shows a nexus between the conduct or statements and the employment 
decision at issue. For example, isolated or stray remarks not shown, un­
der the standards generally applied for weighing the sufficiency of evi­
dence, to have motivated the employment decision at issue are not suffi­
cient.135 
This "stray remarks" language seems to mirror Justice O'Connor's 
negative definition of direct evidence,13 6 indicating that Congress may 
have intended to codify such a requirement in the motivating factor 
provision. Some courts, however, also hold that stray remarks are in­
sufficient proof of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas­
Burdine model.13 7 Thus, the Conferees may simply have intended to 
require the same nature of proof in all employment discrimination 
cases, without setting a higher standard in cases under the motivating 
factor provision than existed under McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. 
133. Other commentators have noted Congress's silence - or at least its ambiguity -
regarding the direct evidence requirement under the CRA. See, e.g. , Davis, supra note 52, at 
750-51 ("Nothing in the statute or its legislative history suggests that a plaintiff cannot rely 
on circumstantial evidence to show that discrimination motivated the employer. A plaintiff 
may offer all proof of discriminatory intent, whether direct or circumstantial, under the mo­
tivating factor test of the Civil Rights Act of 1991."). 
134. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-856, at 18-19 (1990). 
135. Id. 
136. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
("[S]tray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual harassment, cannot 
justify requiring the employer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on 
legitimate criteria." (internal citation omitted)). 
137. Malamud, supra note 16, at 2324. 
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Contrary evidence in the record suggests that Congress considered 
the direct evidence requirement and, in its silence, tacitly incorporated 
Justice O'Connor's standard. During Senate hearings, Eleanor 
Holmes Norton - testifying as a Georgetown University law profes­
sor and the former chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission - responded to critics of the legislation who claimed the 
Act would punish employers for mere thoughts. Norton argued that 
"[t]he notion that title VII ever allowed thoughts as evidence is a sur­
prise . . . .  There must be direct evidence of discrimination . . . .  [A]t 
least one . . .  piece of that direct evidence may have been the motivat­
ing factor."138 Following her statement, Norton and the Committee 
Chair, Senator Edward Kennedy, engaged in the following exchange: 
THE CHAIRMAN: So your reading as well as those of the responses is 
we're not talking about thoughts, we are talking about motivating fac­
tors. 
Ms. NORTON: There has to be direct evidence of a motivating factor. 
Thoughts are no more evidence in a mixed-motive case than they are in a 
single-motive case. 
THE CHAIRMAN: All right. 139 
As opaque as this passage appears, one could argue that Norton's tes­
timony at least provided notice to the legislators that plaintiffs bring­
ing suit under the new statute would be required to adduce direct evi­
dence. 
For a variety of reasons, however, Norton's statements do not indi­
cate a congressional intent to codify Justice O'Connor's direct evi­
dence requirement. First, it is not at all clear from her remarks what 
Norton meant by "direct evidence," because she, like Justice 
O'Connor, failed to define the term. Indeed, it is probable that the 
Professor, like the lower courts, had no clear understanding of Justice 
O'Connor's terminology, and that she was merely invoking the par­
lance that had gained favor among the lower courts.140 Second, Senator 
Kennedy's apparent acquiescence to Norton's explanation of the di­
rect evidence requirement does not indicate that he understood what 
the requirement meant - much less that he intended to codify it into 
law. Rather, taken in context, Senator Kennedy's response is best un-
138. Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2104 Before the Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources, lOlst Cong. 251, 171 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of 
Professor Eleanor Holmes Norton). 
139. Id. at 172. 
140. It is worth noting that Norton's testimony - and the Senate Hearings in general -
followed soon after Price Waterhouse was handed down. It may be safe to assume that at this 
time the lower courts had not had sufficient opportunity to engraft the direct evidence re­
quirement into case law. Rather, Norton was likely referring to the direct evidence standard 
that some courts had required in mixed-motive cases before Price Waterhouse was decided. 
E.g., Terbovitz v. Fiscal Ct. of Adair County, Ky., 825 F.2d 111,  1 15-16 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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derstood as signaling satisfaction with Norton's rebuttal of the argu­
ment that the statute would police thoughts. The Chairman's own 
comments in separate portions of the legislative history give no hint 
that he - or, for that matter, any of his colleagues - intended to 
codify the direct evidence requirement.141 Professor Norton's remarks 
thus provide little support for any finding of congressional intent. 
Several factors may explain Congress's failure explicitly to address 
the nature of proof that plaintiffs must adduce to trigger the motivat­
ing factor provision. First, although Price Waterhouse was one of the 
major cases of the Supreme Court's 1989 term that Congress targeted 
in the CRA, the legislators devoted more of their energies to other 
portions of the statute.142 It is entirely feasible that the legislators 
chose to allocate more of their time and political resources to the 
amendments related, for example, to the availability of jury trials un­
der Title VIl143 or the burdens of proof in disparate treatment cases144 
than to obscure language in Justice O'Connor's concurrence. 
A second possible explanation for the congressional silence on the 
issue of direct evidence is that the legislators were more concerned 
with the allocation of liability under Price Waterhouse than they were 
with methods of proof. Congress's primary aim in overturning the 
Court's decision was to ensure that remedies remain available to 
plaintiffs even where the employer succeeds on the same-decision de­
fense.145 In other words, Congress had no desire to tamper with the 
burden-shifting structure of mixed-motive claims made available by 
Price Waterhouse; it simply wanted to expand the availability of relief. 
Because the plurality's decision with respect to shifting burdens satis­
fied the legislators, they saw no need to address the nature-of-proof 
requirement. 
141. In his opening statement, for example, Senator Kennedy remarked that an em­
ployee is entitled to relief when he or she "demonstrates that prejudice actually motivated 
an employment decision." Hearings, supra note 138, at 102. The Senator later added that: 
the burden falls on the plaintiff to show that a discriminatory motivation actually contrib­
uted - was a motivating factor - in the decision, and has to demonstrate that and has to 
prove it. If they aren't able to prove it, then we are not dealing with what this particular pro­
vision provided. They have to prove it. 
Id. at 1 16. Nowhere did the Chairman mention the nature of proof that the bill required. 
142. See CATHCART ET AL., supra note 95, at 14-15 (explaining that the section of the 
statute related to disparate impact and business necessity attracted the bulk of the legisla­
tors' attention). 
143. Cf. id. at 9 (arguing that the CRA's introduction of jury trials is perhaps its "most 
significant aspect," because it "fundamentally changes the legal model underlying federal 
employment discrimination Jaws"). 
144. See id. at 14-15 ("No other section of the Act generated as much controversy and 
attracted as much attention as that which addresses the Supreme Court's decision in Wards 
Cove . . . .  [T]he measures relating to the disparate impact analysis formed the basis for prot­
estations from the Bush Administration." (citations omitted)). 
145. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 101-856, at 18 (1990); see also Hearings, supra note 138, 
at 102 (opening statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
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Finally, it is possible that the direct evidence requirement simply 
had not gained common currency by the time Congress drafted the 
motivating factor provision. The motivating factor provision was 
drafted as part of the doomed Civil Rights Act of 1990, and its lan­
guage, with only one exception,146 remained largely intact in the 1991 
Act. Thus, the portion of the Act dealing with mixed-motive claims 
was drafted rather soon after Price Waterhouse was handed down in 
the summer of 1989. At the time, it may not have been foreseeable -
except, perhaps, to Professor Norton - that the courts would engraft 
the direct evidence requirement into the case law.14 7 
Given the silence in the legislative history on the matter of direct 
evidence, Congress likely gave little thought to Justice O'Connor's 
concurrence. This Note concludes that the legislators assumed that 
plaintiffs bringing suit under the motivating factor provision would be 
able to adduce both direct and circumstantial evidence in proving their 
case.148 The following Section reveals that, like the legislative history 
regarding the direct evidence requirement, the record concerning the 
continued distinction between pretext and mixed-motive claims suffers 
from a marked vagueness. Both areas of confusion, therefore, should 
be clarified by reference to the plain language of the statute. 
2. Legislative Intent and the Pretext/Mixed-Motive Distinction 
Although commentators have read some lower court decisions as 
ruling that the CRA erased the confusing distinction between pretext 
claims under McDonnell Douglas-Burdine and mixed-motive claims,149 
146. As drafted, the CRA of 1990 initially prohibited any decision in which a protected 
characteristic was a "contributing factor." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-755, at 4 (1990). Even­
tually the legislators replaced "contributing factor" with "motivating factor." H.R. CONF. 
REP. No. 101-856, at 4 (1990). 
147. See supra note 140. 
148. Other commentators have reached this conclusion. See Davis, supra note 52, at 750-
51 ("Nothing in the statute or its legislative history suggests that a plaintiff cannot rely on 
circumstantial evidence to show that discrimination motivated the employer. A plaintiff may 
offer all proof of discriminatory intent, whether direct or circumstantial, under the motivat­
ing factor test of the Civil Rights Act of 1991."); Harold S. Lewis, The Civil Rights Act of 
1991 and the Continued Dominance of the Disparate Treatment Conception of Equality, 1 1  
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L .  REV. 1 ,  10 (1992) ("Whether plaintiff's initial proof takes the form of 
'direct' anecdotal testimony of discriminatory motive; substantial . . .  evidence . . .  ; or simply 
the more common 'inferential' formula, the employer must demonstrate 'that it would have 
taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor' . . . .  " (citations 
omitted)). 
149. Karen A. Haase, Mixed Metaphors: Model Civil Jury Instructions for Title VJ/ Dis­
parate Treatment Claims, 76 NEB. L. REV. 900, 918 (1997), cites O'Day v. McDonnell 
Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1996), and Allen v. City of Athens, 937 F. 
Supp. 1531 (N.D. Ala. 1996), as holding that the 1991 Act eliminated the pretext/mixed­
motive distinction. But a close reading reveals that Haase misapprehends these cases. In the 
O'Day passage cited by Haase, the court makes clear that it is discussing only mixed-motive 
claims, O'Day, 79 F.3d at 760-61, and the Allen court separately assessed the plaintiff's evi-
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no circuit has clearly and consistently held that the Act had such an 
effect. This Note argues that the plain language of the statute can be 
read as having eliminated the division between pretext and mixed­
motive - a conclusion that the legislative history does not preclude. 
Some circuit courts, however, disagree with this assessment.150 Section 
l.B.2 above refuted the text-based arguments in Watson v. Southeast­
ern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,151 which held that the dis­
tinction remains intact after the CRA.152 This Section considers that 
decision's holding regarding the pretext/mixed-motive distinction and 
demonstrates that the court's analysis does not mandate the conclu­
sion drawn in that case. 
In addition to its textual analysis, the Watson court examined the 
legislative history of the CRA and concluded that Congress intended 
to preserve the division between pretext and mixed-motive claims. 
The court cited various portions of the congressional reports and 
hearings indicating that the motivating factor provision's primary pur­
pose was to overturn Price Waterhouse's liability holding.153 In support 
of its interpretation, the court cited dicta in Landgraf v. US! Film 
Products,154 where the Supreme Court stated that the motivating factor 
provision responds to Price Waterhouse "by setting forth standards 
applicable in 'mixed motive' cases."155 Additionally, the Watson court 
concluded that interpreting the CRA as eliminating the confusing dis­
tinction would not simplify employment discrimination law,156 noting 
that other tests, such as the "determinative factor" standard in Title 
VII retaliation cases, would continue to exist in different contexts. 
The legislative history arguments in Watson are weak at best. The 
court's finding that the motivating factor provision was conceived pri­
marily as a response to Price Waterhouse is sound; the legislative his­
tory is unambiguous on this point.15 7 Simply because Congress in­
tended for the provision to overturn Price Waterhouse in the mixed-
dence under McDonnell Douglas and § 2000e-2(m), the motivating factor provision, Allen, 
937 F. Supp. at 1545. 
150. See, e.g., Fields v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Dis­
abilities, 115 F.3d 1 16, 124 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[T]he distinction between 'dual motivation' and 
'substantial motivation' jury instructions survives the 1991 Act."); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 
1 137, 1143 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Section 107 was intended to benefit plaintiffs in mixed-motive 
cases; it has nothing to say about the analysis in pretext cases such as this one."). 
151. 207 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2000). 
152. See supra notes 120-130 and accompanying text. 
153. Watson, 207 F.3d at 218-19. 
154. 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
155. Id. at 251. 
156. Watson, 207 F.3d at 220. 
157. See supra text accompanying notes 134-135 (citing congressional language ex­
pressing an intent to overturn Price Waterhouse). 
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motive context, however, does not mean that it wished for the moti­
vating factor test to be available only to mixed-motive plaintiffs. In 
other words, Congress may have contemplated that the motivating 
factor provision, while targeted primarily at Price Waterhouse, would 
have broader implications.158 Moreover, most courts and scholars who 
have considered the issue disagree with the Watson court's conclusion 
that eliminating the distinction would not simplify employment dis­
crimination law.159 Juries seem better equipped to apply separate tests 
for discrete claims - for example, motivating factor for a race dis­
crimination claim and determining factor for an accompanying retalia­
tion claim - than to consider different standards - i.e., McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine and the motivating factor provision - for the same 
claim.1 60 
By now the irony should be clear: the lower federal courts gleaned 
a direct evidence requirement from a single concurring opinion in a 
case that Congress expressly rejected, and they subsequently grafted 
that requirement onto the very statutory provision that overturned the 
decision. Based on an analysis of the statute's text and legislative his­
tory, this Part concludes that courts should turn to the text of the stat­
ute as their touchstone in resolving the considerable confusion sur­
rounding individual employment discrimination claims. Part II carries 
that textualist analysis a step further in seeking to clarify the current 
law for practitioners and courts. 
II. NAVIGATING THE "SWAMP" IN PRACTICE: 
TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE - AND COMPREHENSIBLE - JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Individual employment discrimination law currently manifests two 
heads - pretext and mixed-motive - that emanate from the same 
body of law - Title VII. This Part returns to that body of law to 
fashion a set of jury instructions that can be used in all individual dis­
parate treatment cases, regardless of whether the claim would tradi­
tionally have been classified as pretext or mixed-motive. Section II.A 
then explains that the proposed model instructions are supported by 
the text and spirit of the CRA, and Section 11.B locates support for the 
instructions in court decisions and other commentary. 
158. Cf Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure, supra note 42, at 604-05 (arguing that the 
motivating factor provision has implications beyond mixed-motive claims). 
159. See supra notes 42, 51, infra notes 161-162 and accompanying text (discussing the 
confusion created by the current division between pretext and mixed-motive cases). 
160. Cf. Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure, supra note 42, at 603-04 (reaching a 
similar conclusion). 
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A. Proposed Jury Instructions for Disparate Treatment Employment 
Discrimination Cases 
This Section argues that a single set of instructions for both pretext 
and mixed-motive claims would greatly clarify this muddled area of 
the law, and it turns to the language of the CRA for guidance in de­
vising these instructions. The Act provides a valuable starting point in 
large part because it eschews the direct evidence requirement. Under 
current law, a discrimination plaintiff reaches the end of trial unsure 
what "direct evidence" means, or at least uncertain whether she meets 
the threshold that will satisfy the particular panel she may draw on 
appeal.161 Thus faced with the possibility that she will lose her mixed­
motive claim for lack of sufficiently direct evidence, the plaintiff re­
quests that the jury be instructed under both the mixed-motive and the 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine modes of analysis.1 62 
This Section proposes resolving the problem of dual instructions 
by jettisoning the division between pretext and mixed-motive in favor 
of a single motivating factor test. The Section derives this test largely 
from the text of the CRA's motivating factor provision, coupled with 
the Act's same-decision provision. Using the CRA as a model, this 
Note proposes the following set of instructions for use in disparate 
treatment cases: 
In light of all of the evidence that has been presented, was the plaintiff's 
[protected characteristic] a motivating factor in the defendant's [adverse 
employment) decision? 
If the defendant was motivated by the plaintiff's [protected characteris­
tic], would the defendant have made the same decision even if it had not 
considered the plaintiff's [protected characteristic)? 
If you find that the defendant would have made the same decision if it 
had not considered the plaintiff's [protected characteristic), I will decide 
what kind of relief is equitable to correct the violation of the law. If you 
find, however, that the defendant would not have made the same deci­
sion, you must also determine [the amount of damages to award). 
161. Cf Robyn S. Hankins, Whose Burden Is It, Anyway? The 11 th Circuit 's Evolving 
Standard for "Burden-Shifting" in Employment Discrimination Cases, FLA. BAR J., Mar. 
2000, at 58, 62 (concluding, after surveying mixed-motive cases in the Eleventh Circuit, that 
"[t]he only real difference between these cases is the panel deciding them"). Hankins's ex­
amination of the jurisprudence in this area suggests that the direct evidence standard, at 
least in the Eleventh Circuit, "is really no standard at all, akin to the 'I know it when I see it' 
standard that has been applied (and misapplied) to pornography for years." Id. at 62 (foot­
note omitted). 
162. See supra notes 42, 51 ;  cf Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 291 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Courts will also be required to make the often subtle and difficult 
distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' or 'circumstantial' evidence. Lower courts long 
have had difficulty applying McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. Addition of a second burden­
shifting mechanism . . .  is not likely to lend clarity to the process."). 
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These instructions take the form of a special verdict, asking the jury to 
answer specific questions rather than posing the matter in the legal 
framework of "liability" and "damages." 
The above instructions depart in a number of ways from the way 
most courts approach disparate treatment claims. First, the instruc­
tions assume, contrary to the Watson decision,1 63 that the ambiguous 
legislative record does not preclude using the CRA's motivating factor 
provision - § 2000e-2(m) - as the standard for all disparate treat­
ment claims. The instructions also implement Congress's intent to 
render liable all employers who consider an impermissible factor,1 64 
and, for reasons explained below, the instructions abandon the direct 
evidence requirement. Finally, because the motivating factor provision 
serves as the touchstone for the instructions, and because Congress at­
tached the same-decision defense to all claims under the motivating 
factor provision, the instructions make the same-decision defense 
available in all cases. 
These instructions implement a number of changes that would aid 
jurors in grasping the difficult and complicated issues involved in em­
ployment discrimination cases.1 65 Adopting the motivating factor pro­
vision as a uniform standard reduces the costs to litigants and courts, 
who would no longer struggle with the vagaries of McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine and its enigmatic intersection with mixed-motive 
claims. The pretext analysis of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine would 
remain relevant, but only insofar as the burden-shifting scheme allows 
plaintiffs to show that an impermissible consideration was a motivat­
ing factor. 
In accordance with the text of the statute and the legislative his­
tory, the proposed instructions dispense with Justice O'Connor's di­
rect evidence requirement. First, this requirement is not relevant be­
cause the text of the statute makes no reference to "direct evidence." 
Moreover, it is reasonable to infer from Congress's silence that it did 
not intend to codify Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement in 
mixed-motive cases. The vast number of Congresspersons in 1991 
were almost certainly "blissfully unaware"1 6 6  that direct evidence was 
1 63. See supra Sections l.B.2 & l.C.2 (discussing the Watson court's dismissal of the pos­
sibility that the CRA eliminated the pretext/mixed-motive distinction). 
164. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (explaining that the Act overturned 
Price Waterhouse to the extent that the decision allowed employers to escape liability alto­
gether by succeeding on the same-decision defense). 
165. Studies indicate that special verdicts and the use of plain English aid jurors in un­
derstanding the instructions. See John L. Breeden, Jr., & William A Bryan, Jr., Improving 
Jury Deliberations: Perspectives from the Circuit Court Bench, 12 S.C. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 2000, 
at 18, 20, 24 (citing empirical research showing that plain English instructions improve juror 
comprehension and suggesting that special verdict forms help jurors recognize the applicable 
law). 
166. SCALIA, supra note 105, at 32 (stating that, when considering bills, legislators are 
often "blissfully unaware" of issues that later spring up in litigation). 
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even an issue in the area of mixed-motive discrimination. Most of the 
legislators focused their energies on other portions of the Act, and few 
likely realized that Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement 
had become a prerequisite to mixed-motive claims.1 67 Ignorant of the 
requirement, then, Congress assuredly did not intend to codify it in the 
statute. Similarly, many legislators - few of whom, if any, were em­
ployment law experts - may not have realized the differences be­
tween the mixed-motive approach they were enacting and the complex 
burden-shifting structure of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. The "in­
tent" of the 102nd Congress on this issue, therefore, is opaque at best. 
The proposed instructions adhere not only to the CRA's text but 
also to its spirit and purpose. The stated aim of the legislation was "to 
respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the 
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate pro­
tection to victims of discrimination."1 68 The CRA falls in a line of civil 
rights laws designed to afford broad protections against discrimina­
tion, and courts generally construe such laws in a liberal fashion.1 69 
167. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text. 
168. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
169. Congress itself attempted to codify this canon of liberal construction in the failed 
Act of 1990. Section 1107(a) of that legislation read: "All Federal laws protecting the civil 
rights of persons shall be interpreted consistent with the intent of such laws, and shall be 
broadly construed to effectuate the purpose of such laws to provide equal opportunity and 
provide effective remedies." See S. REP. No. 101-315, pt. I, at 4 (1990). Explaining this provi­
sion, a Senate Report stated: 
Departure from the established rules of statutory construction, such as the rule favoring 
broad construction of civil rights laws, interferes with the ability of Congress to express its 
will through legislation . . . .  When the terms of such a statute are susceptible to several al­
ternative interpretations, the courts, consistent with the intent of Congress in enacting that 
law, are to select the construction which most effectively advances the underlying congres­
sional purpose to provide equal opportunity and to provide effective remedies. 
s. REP. No. 101-315, pt. I, at 57-58 (1990). 
Although this rule of construction was deleted from the legislation as ultimately enacted, 
the CRA's broad sweep nonetheless remains clear. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co. , 
31 F.3d 1221, 1235 n.23 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 1 15 S. Ct. 1397 (1995), reaff d 
in part, reinstated in part, vacated in part, rem'd, 65 F.3d 1072 (3d Cir. 1995) ("One overriding 
lesson the 1991 Act tutors . . .  is that Congress was unhappy with the increasingly parsimoni­
ous constructions of Title VII. Essentially, Congress forcefully reminded courts of the canon 
that Title VII and ADEA, as remedial statutes, are to be construed liberally to promote 
their welfare purposes, equality of treatment and employment opportunities."); see also 
Zimmer, Pretext and Mixed Motive, supra note 52, at 11 .  Moreover, the failure of the provi­
sion in the 1990 Act regarding liberal statutory construction does not diminish the fact that 
other courts and commentators have employed this canon in construing civil rights laws. See 
Int'! Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 381 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) ("The evils against which [Title VII] is aimed are defined 
broadly . . . .  Accordingly, under longstanding principles of statutory construction, the Act 
should 'be given a liberal interpretation . . .  .' "); Powell-Ross v. All Star Radio, Inc., No. 95-
1078, 1995 WL 491291, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 1995) ("[D]efendants' narrow reading con­
tradicts the well-established liberality with which we are directed to construe [Title VII]."); 
3A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 74.08 (4th ed. 1992) 
("Where employment issues come under the Civil Rights Acts liberal construction is the 
rule . . . .  "). 
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Viewed within the larger context of Title VII, the motivating factor 
provision sets a broad standard that affords relief to all victims of dis­
crimination who meet its standard, regardless of the type of evidence 
they adduce.1 70 
Finally, the plain language of the statute in no way suggests that 
the motivating factor provision is limited to mixed-motive claims. 
Rather, it states simply that "an unlawful employment practice is es­
tablished" when the plaintiff shows that his or her protected trait was 
a "motivating factor" in the employer's decision.1 71 Reading the statute 
on its face and within its broader context, then, the motivating factor 
provision creates a uniform motivating factor test that applies in all 
disparate treatment cases. 
B. Other Attempts to Simplify the Jury's Task 
This Note is not the first attempt to reform the pretext/mixed­
motive muddle. Courts, practitioners, and other commentators have 
sought to alleviate the confusion that two separate instructions create, 
but their suggestions have failed to take hold. This Section examines 
these efforts and concludes that, while informative, these failed at­
tempts are insufficiently grounded in the text of Title VII. 
Many of the most cogent calls for reform and substantive sugges­
tions for improvement hail from the practitioners and courts who deal 
with the law in the trenches. In his concurrence in Miller v. Cigna 
Corp. ,172 Judge Greenberg bemoaned that employment discrimination 
law is "cursed with elusive terms like 'mixed motives' and 'pretext,' " 
and he proposed dispensing with the "unhelpful monikers" alto­
gether.1 73 The Judge first examined the Supreme Court's decision in 
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,174 concluding that Hazen had abandoned 
the notion of an independent category of mixed-motive cases.1 75 Judge 
Greenberg also stated that the Hazen Court expressed discomfort with 
170. See Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure, supra note 42, at 600-01. 
171. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994). 
172.  47 F.3d 586, 599 (3d Cir. 1995) (Greenberg, J., concurring). 
173. Id. 
174. 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) ("Whatever the employer's decisionmaking process, a dis­
parate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually played 
a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome."). Biggins, a 
sixty-two-year-old terminated employee, alleged that Hazen Paper had violated both the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA'') and the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") when it fired him in order to prevent his pension benefits 
from vesting. See id. at 606-07. The Court stated that although an employee's age and his or 
her years of experience may correlate, they are "analytically distinct" characteristics. Id. at 
611. The Court held that Biggins's benefits were close to vesting because of his years of 
service, not because of his age, and that the employer's decision to terminate him because of 
his years of service did not, without more, violate the ADEA. Id. 
175. Miller, 47 F.3d at 603 (Greenberg, J., concurring). 
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Burdine's shifting burdens and presumptions, and indeed with "pre­
text" liability in general17 6 - a position he said the Court confirmed in 
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.177 According to Judge Greenberg, 
Hicks instructed district courts to employ pretext analysis only insofar 
as it, along with other evidence in the record, sheds light on the ulti­
mate question: whether intentional discrimination occurred.1 78 Be­
cause the Judge understood Hazen as having eliminated a separate 
category of mixed-motive cases and Hicks as having dispensed with a 
separate class of pretext claims, he concluded that the Court had left 
itself with one broad category of disparate treatment cases.1 79 
Other courts, like Judge Greenberg, have eliminated the distinc­
tion between pretext and mixed-motive cases at the jury instruction 
phase. In Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. ,180 the Second Circuit recog­
nized the difficulties that the ambiguous direct evidence requirement 
ultimately creates during jury instructions. Dismissing the requirement 
as an odd fixation by the lower courts on language that was not con­
trolling in Price Waterhouse, the Tyler court stated that the jury in­
struction simply must comport with the statute.181 The court added that 
although McDonnell Douglas, Burdine, and Price Waterhouse are use­
ful tools for judges deciding motions for summary judgment,182 they 
are not appropriate schemas for jury instructions, in part because they 
were laid down before jury trials were available in Title VII cases.183 
The Tyler court thus required the plaintiff to establish by a prepon­
derance of the evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that the pro-
176. Id. 
177. 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (emphasizing that a Title VII  plaintiff bears the ultimate 
burden of persuasion at all times). 
178. Miller, 47 F.3d 586, 605 (Greenberg, J., concurring) 
179. Id. at 605-06. Unfortunately, Judge Greenberg dropped a final footnote that seem­
ingly reinstated the separate category of mixed-motive cases he declared had been abol­
ished. He stated that a "limited category" of Price Waterhouse cases remained intact, ex­
plaining that such cases exist where the record shows not only that the employer's motives 
were mixed, but also that the plaintiffs evidence is sufficiently direct to shift the burden of 
the same-decision defense to the defendant. Id. at 606 & n.4. Judge Greenberg did not ad­
dress the CRA of 1991, nor did he examine the roots of the direct evidence requirement he 
invoked. It is unclear how his "limited category" of Price Waterhouse cases differs from the 
broader category of mixed-motive claims that he purportedly eliminated. 
180. 958 F.2d 1 176, 1183-85 (2d Cir. 1992). 
1 81. Id. at 1 185. The Tyler court dealt with New York's Human Rights Law, but the 
state law's language is similar to Title VII, and courts have construed it consistently with 
Title VII. Id. at 1180. 
182. But see Malamud, supra note 16, at 2279 ("[A]lthough district courts purport to use 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine, the proof structure actually does little to aid their analysis of 
the facts at summary judgment. Indeed, in practice courts are left largely to their own de­
vices when it comes to determining which factual questions are to be addressed at which 
stage of the proof structure."). 
183. See Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1 185. The CRA first made jury trials available in Title VII 
cases in 1991. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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tected characteristic was a motivating factor in the employer's deci­
sion. If the plaintiff discharges his or her burden, the jury then deter­
mines whether the employer prevails on its affirmative same-decision 
defense.184 
The Tyler court noted that the last step of McDonnell Douglas­
Burdine - where the plaintiff persuades the trier of fact either that a 
discriminatory reason actually motivated the employer or that the em­
ployer's proffered explanation is unworthy of belief - is functionally 
equivalent to the plaintiff's initial burden under Price Waterhouse.185 
The only difference between the two, the court explained, is that the 
mixed-motive plaintiff begins by focusing on the discrimination itself, 
while the pretext plaintiff begins by focusing on his or her qualifica­
tions.186 In other words, the more focused proof of discrimination pre­
sented by a mixed-motive plaintiff allows him or her to bypass the 
bulk of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analysis, but the two modes 
of proof ultimately end up in the same place. Since McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine and Price Waterhouse are simply different routes to 
the same destination, the Tyler court stated that the two methods of 
proof can be boiled down to two central components for the purposes 
of jury instructions: (1) the motivating factor test and (2) the same­
decision defense.187 
Several circuits explicitly recognize the confusion the 
pretext/mixed-motive distinction creates for juries and have taken 
steps to simplify their jury instructions. The Eighth Circuit's Commit­
tee on Model Civil Jury Instructions, for example, adopted Tyler's ap­
proach for many types of disparate treatment claims.188 Although the 
Committee acknowledged the feasibility of separate instructions for 
pretext and mixed-motive claims, it expressed concern with the diffi­
culty courts face in attempting to classify a given case.189 As a result, 
184. Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1 185. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. Once a McDonnell Douglas-Burdine plaintiff establishes that she is a member 
of a protected class, she first must show that she applied for a position for which she was 
qualified. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
187. Id. at 1 187. Tindall, supra note 52, at 367-68, endorses the approach in Tyler, but he 
notes that the test was "short-lived." Indeed, approximately three months after handing 
down Tyler, the Second Circuit moved into the animus-plus camp, see supra notes 38-39 and 
accompanying text, in Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Companies, 968 F.2d 171 (2d 
Cir. 1992). There the court held that, in order for circumstantial evidence to trigger a mixed­
motive instruction, the evidence must be "tied directly to the alleged discriminatory ani­
mus." Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 182. 
The Tyler instructions look markedly similar to the instructions proposed by Professor 
Michael Zimmer. See infra notes 206-210 (summarizing and critiquing Zimmer's proposed 
instructions). 
188. COMMITTEE ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 81-89 (1999). 
189. Id. at 82. 
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the Committee devised a special set of interrogatories to elicit findings 
in borderline pretext/mixed-motive cases.190 Despite these interrogato­
ries, the distinction remained "cumbersome and potentially confus­
ing," and the Committee decided to endorse a motivating factor/same­
decision instruction for all disparate treatment claims arising under the 
ADEA, § 1981, § 1983, and the motivating factor provision.191 But in 
Title VII cases that do not fall under the motivating factor provision 
- presumably all pretext claims, or cases with insufficiently direct 
evidence - the Committee retained separate pretext instructions.192 
The Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar set of model jury instructions 
that employ a motivating factor/same-decision test and special inter­
rogatories, 193 and the Ninth Circuit adopted motivating factor/same­
decision instructions that appear to apply in all disparate treatment 
cases.194 
Despite the efforts of courts like the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits, the confusing distinctions remain. As a result, practitioners 
and scholars also have tried their hand at streamlining the multifac­
eted instructions. Most notably, the American Bar Association's Liti­
gation Section attempted to clarify the morass by drawing a distinction 
between direct and indirect methods of proof.195 Under this method of 
analysis, as in Justice O'Connor's concurrence, the direct method of 
proof corresponds with mixed-motive claims, while indirect methods 
of proof are associated with pretext claims. The ABA's Model Instruc­
tion 1 .02[1] charges: 
To prevail on a claim of intentional discrimination, the plaintiff must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had a rea­
son or motive to discriminate against [him/her] in the matter before this 
court. The plaintiff must prove, either directly or indirectly, that there is 
evidence of intentional discrimination.196 
190. Id. at 184-89. 
191. Id. at 83-84. 
192. Id. at 192. For criticism of the Eighth Circuit's blurring of the pretext/mixed-motive 
distinction, see Haase, supra note 149. 
193. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COMMITIEE ON PATIERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, PATIERN 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) 86-91 (2000). 
194. COMMITIEE ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 86 (1999). 
195. See EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS LAW COMMITIEE, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 11 (1994) [herein­
after ABA MODEL INSTRUCTIONS]. 
196. Id. The instructions explain that: 
[d]irect evidence would include oral or written statements showing a discriminatory motiva­
tion for the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff. Indirect or circumstantial evidence would 
include proof of a set of circumstances that would allow one to reasonably believe that 
[race/color/national origin/gender] was a motivating factor in the defendant's treatment of 
the plaintiff. 
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This instruction seems to apply regardless of the type of evidence ad­
duced - a standard simpler even than this Note's proposed standard. 
But then the Model Instructions muddy the water. Where the plaintiff 
claims her evidence is sufficiently direct, the trial judge reads Instruc­
tion 1.02[2], which defines direct evidence as "evidence of remarks or 
action that, if believed, directly prove that the plaintiff's [membership 
in a protected class] was a factor in the defendant's decision," explic­
itly excluding "stray remarks" from the definition.197 Where indirect 
evidence is implicated, however, the court reads Instruction 1.02[3], 
which delineates the familiar prima facie case of McDonnell Douglas­
Burdine. 198 Thus, although Instruction 1.02[1] appears simply to ask 
whether the defendant intentionally discriminated, the follow-up in­
structions quickly cloud matters for the jury. In cases where the plain­
tiff presents both direct and indirect evidence, the trial court reads all 
three instructions, leaving the jury understandably perplexed. Finally, 
the instructions ignore the text of Title VII by neglecting the same­
decision defense, which is available to defendants under the portion of 
the statute - the motivating factor provision - from which the ABA 
borrowed in devising its instructions. 
Although the ABA makes a valiant effort, the line between direct 
and indirect evidence remains fuzzy, and the subtle differences in the 
approaches, as well as the complexity of the prima facie case, befuddle 
the jury. Thus, no matter how clearly the court articulates the two 
standards, the pretext/mixed-motive distinction inevitably creates con­
fusion for the jurors.199 As a result, numerous practitioners, courts, and 
Id. 
197. Id. at 13 .  The ABA cites case law from the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
supporting its definition. Id. (citing Young v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1 990); 
Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1 990); Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'I 
Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1989); Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 875 F.2d 1325 
(7th Cir. 1 989)). But as the foregoing discussion of the circuit split reveals, see supra notes 
35-41 and accompanying text, those circuits do not currently agree on any single formulation 
of the concept. 
1 98. See ABA MODEL INSTRUCrIONS, supra note 195, at 17. 
1 99. See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1 1 76, 1185 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining 
that McDonnell Douglas, Burdine, and Price Waterhouse are "useful analytical constructs," 
but that they are not appropriate for jury instructions); LEWIS, supra note 42, at 243; Smith, 
supra note 51, at 37; cf Davis, supra note 52, at 706 & n.17 (stating that McDonnell 
Douglas's complicated scheme merely "shifts the burden of incomprehensibility to the jury," 
citing the convoluted jury instructions in Lynch v. Belden & Co., 882 F.2d 262, 265-66 (7th 
Cir. 1989), as an example). 
Some circuits have held that the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine scheme, because of its 
complexity, should not be part of the jury charge at all. See Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 
1016 ( 1 st Cir. 1979) ("McDonnell Douglas was not written as a prospective jury charge; to 
read its technical aspects to a jury . . .  will add little to the juror's understanding of the case, 
and even worse, may lead jurors to abandon their own judgment and to seize upon poorly 
understood legalisms to decide the ultimate question of discrimination."); Mullen v. Princess 
Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1 130, 1 137 (4th Cir. 1988) (criticizing, but upholding as 
harmless error, an "overly complex" McDonnell Douglas jury instruction); see also 8TH CIR. 
MODEL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 188, at 86 ("It is unnecessary and inadvisable to instruct 
October 2001] Toward a Motivating Factor Test 271 
commentators advocate erasing the bewildering distinction, calling for 
a simplification of jury instructions in individual employment dis­
crimination cases.200 
Many scholars who have examined the problem propose model 
jury instructions that would streamline the jury charge and simplify 
the confusing nexus of pretext and mixed motive. Professor Kenneth 
Davis, for example, states that the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine 
scheme's formalism creates evidentiary distortions that defy common 
sense.201 He argues that Hicks, in discarding the pretext-only rule, 
eliminated any justification for retaining the complex burden-shifting 
mechanism, and he therefore advocates jettisoning McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine and replacing it with a motivating factor test.202 Such 
a test, he asserts, would allow the parties to focus on the central issues 
- intentional discrimination and the same-decision defense - with­
out the additional baggage the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine scheme 
carries.203 
Davis does not provide a sample of his proposed instructions, but it 
is reasonable to assume that they would resemble current mixed­
motive instructions, which are, under the 1991 Act, based on a moti­
vating factor test. One prototype reads: 
You have heard evidence that, in terminating Ms. Harding, Acme 
Products was motivated by Ms. Harding's gender, by Ms. Harding's fail­
ure to get along with her coworkers, and by her contacting a client out­
side the scope of her responsibilities. 
If you find that the fact that Ms. Harding is a woman was a motivating 
factor in Acme Product's decision, then you must find that Acme Prod­
ucts is liable for discriminating against Ms. Harding. 
If you also find, however, that Acme Products, even though it was mo­
tivated in part by Ms. Harding's gender, would have terminated Ms. 
Harding anyway for failure to get along with coworkers and/or by con­
tacting the client, then you may find liability, but you may not award 
the jury regarding the three-step analysis of McDonnell Douglas . . . .  "); 9TH CIR. MODEL 
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 194, at 138 ("It is not necessary to instruct the jury regarding the 
presumptions and burdens of the McDonnell Douglas framework for considering indirect 
evidence of a discriminatory motive."). Indeed, in Hicks the Court stated that the complex 
prima facie case "drops out of the picture" once the employer articulates a legitimate, non­
discriminatory reason for its action. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993). 
200. See, e.g., Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 599 (3d Cir. 1995) (Greenberg, J., con­
curring); Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1 185; Zimmer, Pretext and Mixed Motive, supra note 52, at 1 1 ;  
Rutherglen, supra note 42, a t  59. 
201. Davis, supra note 52, at 761. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
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damages. I will decide what kind of relief is equitable to correct the viola­
tion of the law.204 
This example simplifies matters for the jury, focusing its attention on 
the motivating factor and same-decision tests. And because it is de­
rived from the text of the CRA, the example closely resembles this 
Note's proposed instructions. But these instructions are designed only 
for mixed-motive cases, and they do not accommodate pretext plain­
tiffs who do not offer direct evidence, whatever that may be. 
Other proposed instructions attempt to adhere to this formula 
without entirely jettisoning the distinctions between pretext and 
mixed-motive claims and direct and circumstantial evidence. Professor 
Michael Zimmer offers a hybrid method of instructing the jury that 
draws upon both the ABA's Model Instructions and the motivating 
factor test common in mixed-motive cases.205 Where the plaintiff's case 
involves evidence that could be considered both direct and indirect, 
Zimmer proposes that the trial court first instruct the jury to decide 
whether the evidence does indeed constitute direct evidence of the de­
fendant's intent to discriminate.206 Next the court tells the jury to con­
sider all of the circumstantial evidence presented by either party. The 
jury then must decide, based on all of the evidence, whether the pro­
tected characteristic was a "motivating factor" in the employer's deci­
sion. 20 7 If the jury finds that the protected trait was a motivating factor, 
the plaintiff has carried her burden of proving a violation, and the de­
fendant is liable even if the jury accepts the defendant's legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.208 
Professor Zimmer's approach seems on its face to retain the dis­
tinction between direct and indirect evidence while presenting the dis­
tinction to the jury in a comprehensible fashion. In the end, however, 
Zimmer in fact adopts nothing more than the motivating factor test 
associated with mixed-motive claims under the CRA, which most 
courts apply only in cases involving direct evidence. The distinction 
between direct and indirect evidence serves no purpose in Zimmer's 
scheme, because the essential inquiry for the jury is the ultimate ques­
tion: whether the plaintiff's protected characteristic was a motivating 
factor. Whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial ultimately 
makes no difference, because the jury simply determines, based on all 
of the evidence, whether the impermissible criterion was a motivating 
factor. Since the "directness" of the evidence is therefore irrelevant, 
204. 2 HENRY H. PERRITI, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 88 (1995) (footnote 
omitted). 
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Zimmer's discussion of the distinction is mere surplusage that only 
confuses the jury. 
Despite its shortcomings, Zimmer's approach improves upon cur­
rent jury instructions because it focuses on the ultimate question: the 
motives of the employer. This Note goes a step beyond Zimmer209 -
and a step farther away from case law in the Supreme Court and lower 
courts - in proposing instructions drawn directly from the text of the 
CRA.210 The motivating factor standard employed in this Note is supe­
rior to the standards suggested by other scholars not only because of 
its fidelity to congressional language, but also because it simplifies a 
complex area of the law that currently puzzles judges, lawyers, juries, 
and parties alike. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note demonstrates that the confusion among the lower courts 
over the direct evidence requirement in mixed-motive employment 
discrimination cases has infected the entirety of individual disparate 
treatment law. Faced with a requirement of dubious origins and hap­
hazard application, mixed-motive plaintiffs reach to the complex struc­
ture of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine in order to cover their bases. But 
this sweeping approach only passes the buck to jurors, who are far less 
equipped to make sense of this area of law than plaintiffs' attorneys 
and the courts. The surest way to clear this mess is not to clarify the 
meaning of direct evidence, but rather to simplify the system alto­
gether. 
This Note suggests that the pretext and mixed-motive methods of 
proof can be streamlined into a single standard that simply asks 
whether the plaintiff's protected characteristic was a motivating factor 
in the defendant's employment decision. If the plaintiff can satisfy his 
or her motivating factor burden, the defendant is liable under the 
plain terms of the motivating factor provision. The defendant may 
then minimize its damages by proving that it would have made the 
same employment decision absent the impermissible consideration. 
209. Elsewhere Professor Zimmer, like this Note, has urged a straightforward applica­
tion of the motivating factor provision to all disparate treatment claims brought under Title 
VII. See Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure, supra note 42. But in that article Zimmer 
did not propose a set of jury instructions, nor did he engage in the rigorous textual and leg­
islative history analysis that is central to this Note. 
210. But as Tyler illustrates, see supra notes 180-187 and accompanying text, the instruc­
tions are not entirely without support among the lower courts. In addition, other commenta­
tors have suggested simplifying the complexities of disparate treatment law by focusing on 
the ultimate issue of discrimination, without regard to the distinction between pretext and 
mixed-motive. For example, Malamud, supra note 16, at 2317-18, advocates an open-ended 
standard that dispenses with McDonnell Douglas-Burdine altogether and that focuses in­
stead on whether the plaintiff has proven intentional discrimination by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
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Adopting this proof framework would allow parties to structure their 
behavior according to a plain, articulable standard, thereby benefiting 
both sides of employment discrimination suits. 
